OceanGate Titan bathyscaphe crash: US Coast Guard releases investigation

The US Coast Guard has released the results of the Maritime Board’s investigation into the circumstances of the OceanGate Titan tragedy.

It is noted, that the 300-page report on the circumstances of the disaster, which killed five people, including OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush. The accident shows negligence and disregard for safety rules. On June 18, 2023, the Titan submersible made a commercial dive near the wreck of the legendary Titanic liner off the coast of Newfoundland. 

Stockton Rush was personally in charge of the submersible. He was accompanied by passengers, who paid a considerable sum to take part in the dive. Among them, in particular, were French deep sea explorer Paul-Henri Nargile, British businessman Hamish Harding, Pakistani British businessman Shahzada Daud and his son Suleiman Daud.

At about 10:47 am, the connection with the submersible was lost. At that time, the Titan had already sunk to a depth of 3,346 meters. A loud rumble was heard on board the bathyscaphe. No signals were received from the vessel for the next four days. At that time, a search and rescue operation was conducted.

Wreckage of a bathyscaphe was found at the bottom of the ocean. The hull of the submersible experienced a pressure of 2,236 kg per square centimeter, which led to the instant death of everyone on board. “The Titan simply fell to pieces.

From that moment on, the US Coast Guard began thorough investigation. All those involved in the construction and operation of the bathyscaphe, as well as experts in the field of underwater shipbuilding, were interviewed. In addition, investigators thoroughly examined the wreckage of the Titan and other materials left over from its construction.

The report states that the Titan had a rather unusual design for a submarine. It was completed in 2021. According to the description, it was a manned commercial vessel without documents, registration, certification, or classification.

The total length of the Titan was 6.7 m and its weight was —10,432 kg. The 2.4-meter-long hull could accommodate a team of 5 people. The hull was made of carbon fiber composite, twisted from 13 cm long carbon threads in 5 layers, each 2.5 cm thick, and glued at both ends to hemispherical titanium covers, with the front cover provided with a 58.4-centimeter truncated acrylic window to provide visibility.

The bathyscaphe was powered by four Innerspace electric motors, and theoretically it could operate at a depth of up to 4,000 meters. This carbon composite case was extremely unusual and very different from the steel and titanium ones that are commonly used.

Such composites are made of carbon filaments, fixed in resin. They have many advantages, including much lighter weight, but also serious disadvantages. In particular, pressure and temperature fluctuations lead to degradation of the carbon composite. Whereas metals deform under high pressure and load, carbon composites are much more brittle and the damage they sustain is almost impossible to repair. 

If the manufacturing process was not sufficiently thorough, laminated composites may have defects that include voids, dirt, bubbles, creases, and porosity. These defects can worsen the condition of the device in case of damage to the housing and water ingress into the material. 

In addition, there is almost no available data on the behavior and reaction of these composites to repeated immersion. The situation was aggravated by the fact that titanium covers were bolted to the cylindrical body to the titanium rings. The rings themselves were attached to the case with glue. Even from the point of view of preliminary design, this creates a large number of vulnerabilities.

How Stockton Rush personally drove Titan to its tragic demise

At the same time, the Maritime Board, following an investigation into the circumstances of the disaster, found poor management, negligence, inadequate standards and a general disregard for safety rules. The report notes that OceanGate generally succeeded by using inappropriate methods of operation.

Key principles of Titan’s design were not taken into account during the design and testing process. OceanGate did not analyze how the submersible would react to repeated dives under high pressure.

The Titan was parked for months in snow and rain in Newfoundland, where temperatures fluctuated up and down, and towed thousands of kilometers through rough seas without checking how it would be affected. OceanGate’s management also ignored Boeing’s recommendations to evaluate the Titan submersibleIn particular, the recommendation Boeing included the need to diagonal application of layers on the body to increase strength and add an outer layer of protective foam. 

Overall the threading on the casing was subject to only visual inspection, which led to a large number of dangerous defects that weakened the overall structural integrity of the casing.

To top it all off, the Board of Directors itself OceanGate recognized the company’s corporate culture as toxic. Many of the engineers working on the Titan were hardly qualified, and pilot training was formal.  Stockton Rush took over all key responsibilities and ignored other opinions and advice.

Rush also ignored warnings from others, avoided formal oversight, and disregarded safety rules amid financial problems and delays. He even reduced the number of bolts used to attach the end caps from 18 to 4, as this reduced the time required to install them.

All of this led to the fact that at the time of the sinking on June 18, 2023, Titan was in an extremely poor condition. The investigation revealed defects in the glue that held the titanium rings to which the end caps were attached.

It was also recorded divergence of defective body layers. Improper attitude and disregard for safety rules during operation led to the fact that as a result of the Titan’s submergence, either the cover on the nose was torn off or the entire nose of the submersible was destroyed.

Source: New Atlas